MODEL OF THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN INDONESIA
Ign. Djoko Irianto
Center For Safeguards Technology � Batan
Kawasan Puspiptek Gedung 90 Lantai 3, Serpong � 15310
ABSTRACT
MODEL OF THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN INDONESIA. The design of physical protection system (PPS) for nuclear facilities must be arranged in accordance national and international regulations. The international regulation is outlined on INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 while the national regulations are issued by National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) and Nuclear Energy Control Board (BAPETEN). The design of physical protection system consists of several steps: determine the PPS objectives, make a preliminary design of PPS, analyze the PPS design and probably redesign the PPS. In determining the PPS objectives, first collect information on the condition of the nuclear facilities, including all features of the facilities, operating procedures and elements of physical protection systems. Then, conduct a detailed study of a range of adversaries that the PPS may encounter. Finally design PPS by arranging the best combination of the PPS elements: fences, barriers, sensors and monitor equipment, entry control equipment, communication equipment, procedures and security forces.
Keywords : Physical Protection, Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Facilities,
Published : Proceeding "Seminar Teknologi Pengamanan Bahan Nuklir Ke:1", Jakarta, 21 Nopember 2000.
DESIGN BASIS THREAT (DBT) APPROACH FOR THE FIRST NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY SYSTEM IN INDONESIA
Ign. Djoko Irianto
Center For Safeguards Technology � Batan
Kawasan Puspiptek Gedung 90 Lantai 3, Serpong � 15310
ABSTRACT
DESIGN BASIS THREAT (DBT) APPROACH FOR THE FIRST NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY SYSTEM IN INDONESIA. Design Basis Threat (DBT) is one of the main factors to be taken into account in the design of physical protection system of nuclear facility. In accordance with IAEA's recommendations outlined in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected), DBT is defined as: attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage against the nuclear facilities. There are three types of adversary that must be considered in DBT, such as adversary who comes from the outside (external adversary), adversary who comes from the inside (internal adversary), and adversary who comes from outside and colludes with insiders. Current situation in Indonesia, where many bomb attacks occurred, requires serious attention on DBT in the physical protection design of NPP which is to be built in Indonesia. This paper is intended to describe the methodology on how to create and implement a Design Basis Threat in the design process of NPP physical protection in Indonesia.
Keywords : Physical Protection, Design Basis Threat, Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Facilities,
Published : Proceeding "Seminar Teknologi Pengamanan Bahan Nuklir Ke:5", Jakarta, 29 September 2004.
IMPLEMENTATION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN BATAN'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Ign. Djoko Irianto
Center For Safeguards Technology � Batan
Kawasan Puspiptek Gedung 90 Lantai 3, Serpong � 15310
Email: igndjoko@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
IMPLEMENTATION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN BATAN'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES. Physical protection systems for nuclear facilities have two objectives, i.e., the first to minimize or eliminate the possibility of theft or unauthorized removal of nuclear materials and the occurrence of sabotage, the second to deter incoming threat and localize and retrieve the missing nuclear materials effectively and immediately. In order to achieve these two objectives it requires effective planning of physical protection system for nuclear facilities, which covers detection system, delaying system and response system. The plan for physical protection system for nuclear facilities should also consider the categorization of nuclear materials as the subject of security. This paper discusses some of the implementation of physical protection system in BATAN, assessment on it efficiency and effectiveness, also possible improvement.
Keywords : Physical Protection System, Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Facilities,
Published : Proceeding "Seminar Teknologi Pengamanan Bahan Nuklir Ke:4", Jakarta, 13-14 Oktober 2003.
NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY SYSTEM ANALYSIS BASED ON MEASUREMENT
Ign. Djoko Irianto
Center For Safeguards Technology � Batan
Kawasan Puspiptek Gedung 90 Lantai 3, Serpong � 15310
Email: igndjoko@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY SYSTEM ANALYSIS BASED ON MEASUREMENT. Nuclear material safeguards and security are the important aspect in the nuclear facility management due to the nuclear material could be terrorism object. The two aspect of nuclear material security are nuclear material safeguards system and physical protection system. The most important in safeguards system is how to report the existence of nuclear material and the quantity of nuclear material. To perform the safeguards system the data of nuclear material are needed. The data of quality and quantity of nuclear material could be found by destructive analysis (DA) technique and non destructive analysis (NDA) technique. The DA technique are used to analysis the nuclear material that forming in powder, the NDA technique are used to analysis the nuclear material in spent fuel. In BATAN, the technique of measurement of nuclear material weight is more dominant than the other technique to be used in nuclear material safeguards and security systems.
Keywords: Safeguards Technology, Physical Protection, Nuclear Material, Destructive Analysis, Non Destructive Analysis, Security Systems.
Published : A Scientific Journal "PRIMA : Aplikasi dan Rekayasa Dalam Bidang Iptek", Volume 4, Nomor 8, Nopember 2007, ISSN:1411-0296.
ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN BATAN�S NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Ign. Djoko Irianto, Sumijanto
Center for Reactor Technology and Nuclear Safety � BATAN
Kompleks Puspiptek Serpong, Tangerang Selatan.
ABSTRACT
ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN BATAN�S NUCLEAR FACILITIES. Physical protection system for nuclear facilities has two objectives, i.e.: the first to minimize or eliminate the possibility of theft or unauthorized removal of nuclear materials and the occurrence of sabotage, the second is to deter incoming threat and localize and retrieve the missing nuclear materials effectively and immediately. In order to achieve these two objectives, it requires effective planning of physical protection system for nuclear facilities, which covers detection system, delaying system and response system. According to the Guidance for physical protection implementation, INFCIRC 225 Rev.4, the design of physical protection system for nuclear facilities should also consider the categorization of nuclear materials as the subject of security. This paper discusses the result of analysis of physical protection system implementation in BATAN refer to INFCIRC 225 Rev.4. The result of analysis shows that the implementation of physical protection for nuclear facilities in BATAN had satisfied with the international criteria established by IAEA.
Keywords : Physical Protection, Nuclear Material, BATAN�s Nuclear Facility, INFCIRC.
Published : 2006, Technical Report, Proceeding "PRESENTASI ILMIAH TEKNOLOGI KESELAMATAN NUKLIR XII", ISSN No. : 1410-0533
ROLE OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY USED TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY
Ign. Djoko Irianto
Center For Safeguards Technology � Batan
Kawasan Puspiptek Gedung 90 Lantai 3, Serpong � 15310
Email: igndjoko@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
ROLE OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY USED TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY. The presence of nuclear materials at any nuclear facility must be in secure and must be known as safeguards purpose such as its position, form or type and amount. The clarification of the amount be reported to the national regulatory body and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the international regulatory body. The national regulatory body and IAEA will then verify that report. The verification must be done to know there is no difference of the amount, and to give the assurance to the international community that any diversion of safeguarded nuclear material from civil use to a prescribed military purpose would be detected. To carry out verification, several verification techniques such as non-destructive analysis, surveillance, unattended and remote monitoring and environmental sampling are explained to convey the impression how those techniques are implemented. According to the security requirement, the physical protection system including all components of physical protection system have to be effectively designed.
Keywords: Safeguards technology, physical protection, nuclear material
Published : A Scientific Journal for Safeguards Technology. ISSN:1907-0535. Vol.1 No.1. October 2005.
